Professor John Robertson OBA
From the Chief Nuclear Inspector’s annual report on Great Britain’s nuclear industry October 2025, page 28:
In July 2024, we increased NRS Dounreay to an enhanced level of regulatory attention for safety because of unsatisfactory site performance across numerous areas: the current condition of a number of site assets (such as buildings, electrical systems, steam systems); management and compliance with various aspects of conventional health & safety legislation (such as COMAH and DSEAR); the level of management & organisational change affecting safety culture.
Decommissioning of Dounreay began in 2019 and the plan envisages 50-60 years to complete but ‘complete’ doesn’t mean to the company, Magnox Ltd., what it means to most of us and the site will be under surveillance, i.e. not usable, for at least another 300 years or 110 000 days[i].
However, according to the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, one of the most dangerous elements, left on the soil, Plutonium-239 has a half-life of 24 000 years.[ii]
How much will the decommissioning cost? According to World Nuclear News in 2019, £400 million,[iii] but 5 years later, according to the Northern Times in April 2024, £7.9 billion![iv]
Researchers based at Oxford University, reporting conveniently for some political forces, in July 2014, revisited earlier studies of the incidence of leukaemia around Sellafield and Dounreay and concluded that children, teenagers and young adults currently living close to Sellafield and Dounreay were not at an increased risk of developing cancers.
The researchers, dependent upon UK Government grants for their survival, notably downplayed two earlier studies finding a raised risk of leukaemia among 0–14 and 15-24 year-olds, living within 12.5 km of Dounreay during the period 1979–1984[i] and in a subsequent study in 1996, reported an excess of childhood leukaemia and Non-Hodgkin’s Lymphoma (NHL) within 25 km of Dounreay for the period 1968–1993.[ii]
The researchers do not tell us just how many cases, how many more children and young adults than expected, had developed these often-deadly cancers, but 1 287 cases near seven nuclear sites in Scotland were looked at in the second study. Around Dounreay, almost twice as many cases as expected were found. The difference was greatest around Dounreay but even if we share the 1 287 between the seven sites, we get around 180 cases near Dounreay, of which half or 90, might not have occurred if the plant had never been built. To, me that’s ‘significant’ and I feel sure it was for them and their families.
With every passing month, it becomes clearer that Scottish Labour must reconsider its plans for a nuclear Scotland.
[i] Heasman MA, Kemp IW, Urquhart JD, Black R. Childhood leukaemia in northern Scotland. Lancet. 1986;327 (8475:266.
[ii] Sharp L, Black RJ, Harkness EF, McKinney PA. Incidence of childhood leukaemia and non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma in the vicinity of nuclear sites in Scotland, 1968–93. Occup Environ Med. 1996;53 (12:823–831.
[i] https://www.neimagazine.com/features/featuredounreay-site-restoration-plan/
[ii] https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/radwaste.html
[iii] https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Dounreay-decommissioning-framework-contracts-award
[iv] https://www.northern-times.co.uk/news/new-end-date-at-dounreay-will-mean-a-spend-of-7-9bn-347604/
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Talking-up Scotland 'Albatraz' 
So, all the Unionist parties will continue to put the lives of Scots at risk in their blind obsession with Nuclear Power – or is it to do with the sophisticated lobbying ( bribery ? ) of Nuclear interests ?
Scotland , a country blessed with boundless natural energy resources , is shackled to a nation led by politicians who have never considered the best interests of Scotland or its people in their blatant advancement of policies which simply see us as an asset-rich colony .
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Plutonium-239 has a half-life of 24 000 years. So I’m not sure how that works. Does that mean it will be half safe after 24,000 years. Or 1/4 safe after 48,000 years and so on.
I don’t see me being able to live that long. Still waiting for electricity “too cheap to meter” as HRH Queen Elizabeth promised at the opening ceremony. Don’t see me living long enough for that either.
Wonder why they built it so far away from London?
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” With every passing month, it becomes clearer that Scottish Labour must reconsider its plans for a nuclear Scotland ” – It has been performatively political since renewables in Scotland began breaking records, which it still does with the number of wind turbines paid to be turned off, and that number climbing.
WM requires one token nuclear station in Scotland as a sop for the dozens desperately needed in south-east england, whether the public there want them there or not – Scots are paying through the nose for an arrangement more than 30 years old when England purportedly generated an excess, and HMG would rather continue with that arrangement lest it piss off donors from guess where, SEE.
Despite the ‘Streisand effect” spread long before Labour got the ‘buggin’s turn’ at golden chanty, we’ve had a veritable troupe of effects, the ‘Brian Wilson’, ‘Ian Murray’, and that utterly disingenuous ginger twat from Hamilton, Schapps or Shanks, not because of engineering necessity, but to keep the price of energy high in Scotland – It does add a different dimension to ‘subsidy spongers’ does it not…
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The public record of incidents at Dounreay from CHATGPT: ‘Here is a chronological timeline of known official / media‑reported pollution, health & safety, and regulatory incidents or concerns at the Dounreay nuclear site, from commissioning to the present, based on the sources I located. Some entries are major events; others are smaller leaks or findings. This is not guaranteed exhaustive, but covers all incidents I could verify. I include dates, description, and sources.’ (Sources have been omitted here for brevity. They could be found readily by asking CHATGPT again – for free. Otherwise what follows is as provided by CHATGPT.)
1963‑1975: Discharges of radioactive waste & fuel swarf / illegal dumping to landfill; release of particles via drains to sea. UKAEA pleaded guilty under the Radioactive Substances Act to allowing release of particles to the environment through drains, and disposing of radioactive waste to a landfill site. Part of the problem: contaminated swarf from fuel elements processed in ponds; swarf entering effluent drainage when ponds were drained; solid particles reaching sea/beaches. These releases occurred over this period.
10 May 1977: Waste shaft explosion involving sodium and potassium (Na/K) reaction. A deep waste shaft (65 m), containing radioactive waste plus several kg of sodium & potassium, flooded with seawater; chemical reaction caused explosion, lifting concrete lid, spreading radioactive particles around. Considered one of the worst in Dounreay history in terms of potential, though much of the danger was mitigated.
Between 1963‑1984 (ongoing through those years and beyond): Radiation particles on beaches and seabed; fuel swarf release. Thousands of radioactive particles found over decades around Dounreay (sea floor, beaches, etc.) from past discharges of solid radioactive fuel fragments / swarf. Fishing bans / seafood restrictions near the site (2 km) in place.
1989, Third Quarter: Leak of ~30 g plutonium from a tank; no external release A small quantity of liquor containing about 30 g of plutonium escaped from a tank inside the facility; contained within the building; no public dose.
1990, Fourth Quarter: Worker over‑dose & small liquid leak onto road (a) Worker contamination when loading equipment for decontamination, leading to exceeding yearly radiation dose limits; (b) small leak from a drum of low level radioactive waste onto a road — road surface removed; no public exposure.
1992, Fourth Quarter: Leak of radioactive liquor; operator contamination At Dounreay, small leak of radioactive liquor; two operators had minor contamination to hand/clothing, decontaminated; doses well under legal limits.
29 June 1993: Intake of radioactive material by an operator in residue recovery plant Drum with centrifuge filter opened, small release of radioactive material; one worker later found to have internal dose exceeding legal limit (plutonium oxide intake). Occurred inside plant, fully contained (no environmental release).
1995: Worker overexposure; safety breaches; fine UKAEA fined (≈ £101,000) for safety breaches after workers contaminated with excessive radiation doses; also for accidentally damaging main power cable, causing outage.
7 May 1998: Major power failure in Fuel Cycle Area; safety audit triggered A mechanical digger severed a main 11 kV cable; backup power failed; FCA lost power for ~16 hours. HSE/SEPA raised concerns; safety audit commissioned which identified many weaknesses (management, plant condition, etc.)
1998: Publication of 1998 safety audit; 143 recommendations HSE/SEPA audit published 1 Sept 1998; many urgent recommendations to fix safety and environmental issues; UKAEA issued “Dounreay — The Way Ahead” response; progress monitored.
2007‑2016 (approx.): Removal/destruction of NaK coolant from DFR circuits Over a period of years, the large inventory of liquid metal coolant (NaK: sodium‑potassium alloy), which is highly reactive and radioactive, was removed and destroyed. All of the secondary circuit (~100,000 L) and the primary (~57,000 L) were processed. This reduced a major hazard.
7 October 2014:Fire in the sodium tank farm of Prototype Fast Reactor; unauthorised release of radioactivity** A fire broke out in a PFR sodium tank farm; trace amounts of tritium released; procedural non‑compliances and behavioural failures were cited. ONR issued an improvement notice.
February (year ≈ 2019‑2020?): Contaminated dust release during ventilation testing Dust disturbed; conditions of radioactive substances authorisation contravened; environmental impact and discharge within authorised limits; very low risk. SEPA investigated.
April 2022: Chemical incident at sodium storage facility: small radiological release During planned work at storage tank, a chemical reaction; some radioactive material (possibly tritium) may have been released; damage internal; risk to public/environment “extremely low”. Enforcement letter issued.
1 March 2024: Improvement notice over storage of alkali metals (sodium) in damp conditions Alkali metal storage buildings leaking rainwater; containers of sodium exposed; potential for serious injury though no radiological or environmental release reported.
26 June 2024: Leak from carbon bed filter, water loss of ~1 litre/day; Cs‑137 activity observed A redundant external carbon bed filter (inactive system) was losing water; prior sampling of water had high activity (~61,000 Bq/L) with Cs‑137 dominant; however, steady loss; incident rated “below scale / no safety significance” under ONR categorisation.
7 June 2024: Low‑level contamination discovered on worker’s hand/shoe; work halted Employee had minor contamination; area evacuated; no public/environment risk; INES Level 0 (no safety significance) assigned.
February 2025: Equipment toppled (radiological contamination monitor ~2 tonnes); worker minor injury During moving of heavy monitor, it toppled; worker suffered minor injury; ONR improvement notice issued; risk judged significant.
May 2025 (25 July 2025 extension): Improvement notice extended re: above heavy equipment movement The improvement notice served in April 2025 for the above incident was extended; compliance deadline moved.
Additional / Long‑Term Concerns: The state of legacy waste storage, particularly in old shafts/drums/storage pits, has been a recurring concern. For instance: the waste shaft used between ~1956‑1977 contains mixed waste (plutonium, fuel fragments, sludge, organic material) with uncertain packaging, risking leakage.
Safety culture / management and plant condition have been recurring issues: the 1998 audit heavily criticised weaknesses in management, over‑reliance on contractors, ageing plant, lack of integration of decommissioning strategy.
Environmental contamination monitoring (particles on beaches, foreshore, seabed), with active particle recovery programmes, regulatory monitoring of discharges, etc. ‘
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READING THESE REPORTS NO ‘NEW NUCLEAR’ POWER STATIONS
SHOULD EVER EVER BE GIVEN THE GO AHEAD WITHOUT PUBLIC VOTE
ALL THESE COMPANIES WHO GRANT AND BUILD NUCLEAR
STAY NOWHERE NEAR THE SITE THEY SHOULD BE MANDATED TO WORK AND LIVE WITHIN THE WIDE AREA OF CONTAMINATION
THAT WOULD SURELY MAKE THEM THINK TWICE!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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