By Alasdair Galloway

Before I took ill at the beginning of the year, since as some might remember I have an interest in the independence movement in Wales, I had been reading Will Hayward’s “Independent Nation. Should Wales leave the UK?”.  It still seems to me that a good deal of what Hayward writes about is pertinent to Scotland, some not so much but some more so.

Change in Wales has been rapid. The referendum to set up the Welsh National Assembly only just got over the line, but by the time Hayward was writing (2022), it was no longer a “puny Assembly” but the Welsh Senedd – shades of the Scottish Executive leaving its chrysalis in 2007 to become a government?

Hayward describes the Senedd as “supported by a settled majority of Welsh voters”, and that the “strengthening sense of Welsh identity over the same period cannot be considered a coincidence”. Sound familiar. Even at the beginning of 2013 support for independence in Scotland stood at/about 28%, but now is stubbornly (if you’re a Unionist) above 45% and even beyond 50%

Both of these illustrate a major flaw in thinking about devolution at the time of its introduction. Like the Scots, the Welsh were used to being run from London. As Hayward writes, “many of the defences of the Union treat Wales like some quirky old uncle of whom everyone is very fond but who is a bit hapless”. Like the Jockos they need to be looked after. Poor things.

However,  give them the chance to run their own affairs – even some of them – for themselves – allows them to come to the conclusion  that they aren’t bad at it and don’t need Mama Westminster’s help, thank you very much. Next thing you know they want more.

Yet at the same time the view of devolution from London could only – and this is being kind – be described as “patronising”, that the Union is not an equal Union, not really. For one thing, even if we do consider it is the Scottish people who are sovereign, the practical reality (if not the legal reality which is contended by such as Salvo) was confirmed by the Supreme Court who determined the House of Commons (though not the government) holds sovereignty in the UK.

In turn this feeds through to the “other” member nations of the Union, and how they perceive not only themselves, but the status of their governments in Edinburgh and Cardiff. In the early days of devolution the Assembly/ Parliament, run by Executives, were perceived to have little in the way of significance. Even Tony Blair whose government set it up “suggested his party’s long-promised parliament for Scotland would have no more powers than an English parish council because sovereignty would remain “with me” at Westminster.”  (https://www.irishtimes.com/news/labour-attempts-to-defuse-blair-s-parish-council-power-for-scots-1.59202).

But now, in Wales, independence is seen and supported as the most effective means of resolving Wales’s problems, which, of course is the same for many independence supporting Scots, concerning our own country. As Hayward writes, “Facing lots of serious problems is hard, but facing problems without the means to solve them leads to hopelessness”. The root problem he argues is “the current setup of the UK [which] makes it almost impossible to tackle them [serious Welsh problems] in a meaningful way”.

For one thing, as Hayward recognises, the amount of money sent from London to Wales has little or no relation to Wales’ needs (or Scotland for that matter), because what is sent is calculated to address priorities in England, where, as in Scotland, the Conservatives are a minority group. Even though in 2019 the Welsh Conservative vote increased and with it the number of seats, they still won only 14 out of 40 seats (35%). Better (or worse, depending on your point of view) in Scotland where they won 10% of seats. The fact is that the foundation of Conservative support is in England (65% of English MPs), and the House of Commons, where sovereignty lies. So Wales, in terms of anti-Tory sentiment is very different from England, but they aren’t at the point of being an endangered species as they are here.

Yet, it’s not all bad for the House of Commons and England, since by putting responsibility for devolved matters into the hands of the devolved administrations, they can effectively wash their hands of such matters everywhere but England. This is so even though the resources applied to such as Education or Health are not necessarily what a Welsh or Scottish Government would apply if they were the sovereign government and free to do so. As above, their “spending envelope” is determined by decisions taken by House of Commons Ministers. The Welsh and Scottish Ministers can decide how much to spend on Health and Education within the quantum of spending. In addition such as Welfare, Defence and other spending “on behalf of Wales” (or Scotland) is determined at Westminster. And not only those matters, but the total spend is determined at Westminster, though spending on devolved matters can be moved around.

This was seen particularly graphically during the pandemic when the Welsh and Scottish governments (who took a more interventionist line) wanted to put another lockdown in place. Faced with resistance or downright refusal from Westminster, there was nothing the Welsh or Scots could do. For one thing they were quite unable to fund this (funding furlow for instance) from their own cash limited resources. Routinely, it was a matter of waiting for London to move.

Set against this Leanne Wood in an article published on Bella Caledonia, relates that “The group [PC] says that in the first months of 2020, its membership doubled from 2,500 to 5,000. When the UK government refused to pay furlough to workers in Wales subject to the 17-day fire-break brought in by the Welsh government in October 2020, Yes Cymru reported that its membership numbers had risen by 3,000 in just three days. In March 2021, the group announced that it had reached 18,000 members.” (https://bellacaledonia.org.uk/2023/11/02/wales-and-the-break-up-of-britain).  

It should also be recognised that the criticism of Nicola Sturgeon for not implementing lock down in Scotland earlier, is quite misleading. As Devi Sridhar argues (https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/englands-decision-to-delay-lockdowns-cost-more-lives-says-professor-devi-sridhar-g2059nqgw) Scotland “was prevented from imposing an early lockdown because there was no agreement on furlough pay.” And what is the alternative? Tell folk they must not go to work, but there will be no compensation. That will go down well and could even be a quicker way of crashing an economy than even Liz Truss knows of. But compensation is under the control of another part of the Union, which holds a contrary view, but does have the necessary powers, all they can do is wait and use what powers of persuasion they have.

Blair may have caused offence when, even before the referendum vote, he contrasted the Scottish Parliament with a Parish Council, but, while it might be something of an exaggeration, there is still a truth in it, that the powers of the Scottish Parliament are not only lesser in comparison to the House of Commons, but those powers it does possess are only at the grace and favour of the Commons. They can be removed whenever the House of Commons so decides. THAT subordination is the reality of the devolution of powers that not only faces Scotland, but Wales as well.

A reaction to this is described by Wood in that “The Commission on the Future of Wales [https://www.gov.wales/independent-commission-constitutional-future-wales] is seriously considering independence as one of a number of viable options for Wales’ future”).

Probably it’s best to emphasise that this body was appointed by the Welsh Government, which is of course Labour, so for it to be treating independence for Wales seriously is significant change. You can just imagine a Scottish Labour appointed group doing the same thing. Can’t you?

Moreover, their First Minister, Mark Drakeford, is already on record as saying that the current constitutional framework is dysfunctional, speaking of something more like a confederation of the Home Nations, at a time when the London government is set on a determined path to recentralise the UK by one means or another. Drakeford’s own party at UK level seems set on a similar path. To paraphrase “The X Files”, “The truth is out there”.

Set against this sort of outcome, as Hayward reflects about Wales (and much the same could be said of Scotland), “In reality Welsh sovereignty simply doesn’t exist; it is on loan from London and can be taken back. But far more likely than abolishing  devolution  – after all the UK government understands it is popular – is the erosion of powers in Wales”.

What this sets up is a conflict of two philosophies, or views of not so much what the UK is, but what it should be. One side aims to create four nations, in a much looser structure than we have just now, in which four nations can act in ways consistent (as far as possible) with the wishes of their electorates. In this regard Scotland remains more ambitious than Wales, seeking full independence, though even the possibility of a confederal UK by a Welsh Labour FM is itself remarkable.

The other side – the Westminster government – is looking to move in quite the opposite direction so that all the regions (not nations?) act in concert with each other, subject to the same rules and indeed with an identity that is, at least primarily, British. The problem is that the devolved nations exist only at the discretion of Westminster. It holds not just the good cards, but really almost all the cards. Their problem is the popularity of devolution both in Scotland and Wales. Their target is therefore obvious – the popularity of those devolved administrations. The current strategy is to undermine and ignore them at every opportunity – the Internal Market Act being the best example as its requirement of “mutual recognition” means that each administration must recognise, for instance, food standards set elsewhere in the UK, opening the possibility of the lowest standards becoming the norm.

Thus, while Wales came a bit ‘late to the party’, and is less ambitious in regard to the changes to the structure of the UK that it seeks, there are clear parallels between the situation in Wales and in Scotland. In particular, in both countries there are large (and in Wales growing) constituencies for whom the current structure of the UK is no longer acceptable.

How close are we to the point where the absence of a question mark in Tom Nairn’s landmark book, “The breakup of Britain” (published 1977) no longer can be seen as an omission but a description of the reality of the UK? This will require the defeat of the centralising Westminster point of view, but recent events could be said to suggest that we might expect Westminster itself to be one of the change movement’s biggest assets. Over the last 10 years there have been no fewer than five Prime Ministers; the UK has left the EU but still not negotiated a long term relationship with its former partner; debt largely as a result of Covid has risen exponentially; despite being one of Europe’s largest producers of energy the irony is that we face some of the highest prices; inflation of energy prices but more generally are condemning more of the population to poverty; the next election seems likely to bring to power a Labour Party whose difference from the current Conservative Party seems very small indeed, in particular with regard to attitudes to devolution.

It might seem that this is a situation which cannot persist, but the fact is that the Unionist side controls the sovereign legislature and is 85% of the population of the UK. Perhaps the question is for how long they can continue to “hold fast” (John Smith, Speaker of the House of Commons 1707) not just Scotland and Wales.

Then there is Northern Ireland. Recently, Steve Baker, a junior minister in the Northern Ireland office, floated the notion that in any border poll for reunification the majority should not be 50%+1, but even as much as 60% or more. Despite being slapped down by the Irish Deputy Prime Minister, this indicates that Westminster is looking to the future and a border poll, anxious to shore up their chances of success. If Ireland is reunified, what will the consequences for the UK be, but in particular for Wales and for Scotland? Might this be the ‘starting gun’ they have been waiting for? Will Britain break up “with a bang or a whimper?

One other thing this indicates, on the basis of “my enemy’s enemy is my friend”, is the importance of the independence movements to not only find common cause – they have that – but to work together collaboratively with agreed strategies so that the UK is less able to use their customary “divide and rule” practices.  More than fraternal meetings/ conference addresses is needed, but some sort of formal organization for the common aim of “the breakup of Britain” is needed. As a foundation for this, identifying the parallels and the commonalities will be important. Hopefully, this has, in a small way, contributed to that.