By stewartb – a long read

The relevance of the first part of the title is self-evident: how to shift more voters in Scotland towards supporting independence. With a UK General Election relatively soon and the next Holyrood election not so far off, there is an urgency.  Whilst politicians and political strategists have been offering up different views on routes to the final outcome of independence, amongst the elements that constitute each – often worryingly partial – ‘theory of change’ is the basic one of democratic legitimacy through electoral support.

New insights from the USA point up the difficulties – even with well-funded, targeted campaigning – of changing fixed views.

Testing campaign messaging

The New York Times (28 September) published an article entitled ‘Republican Group Running Anti-Trump Ads Finds Little Is Working’. It included a link to a memo sent to investors in the ‘Win It Back’ Political Action Committee (PAC). The latter had this objective: ‘.. to identify an effective approach to lower President Trump’s support among Republican primary voters so we can maximize an alternative candidate’s ballot share when the field begins to consolidate.’

Source https://int.nyt.com/data/documenttools/win-it-back-memo/8b03e0071ad48d30/full.pdf

The PAC funded extensive exploratory research with voters across the US and in states with early primaries, Iowa and South Carolina: ‘After conducting extensive message testing through several live-phone and online surveys, both nationally and in early states, we produced more than 40 television ads that we tested in 12 in-person focus groups and four online randomized controlled experiments. We also tested publicly available digital and television ads produced by other groups via the same methods.’

The PAC then ran test media campaigns using a sub-set of adverts that appeared from initial research to be those likely to be most damaging to Trump. It did so in selected ‘media markets’ in Iowa (spending over $4 million) and in South Carolina (spending c. $1.8 million). It subsequently determined the impact of each campaign relative to control groups in other parts of the two states through public opinion surveys: the results, showing only moderate successes, can be found in the memo.

Resilience

The findings from the initial efforts of the PAC are salutary. Here is a selection (with my emphasis):

1) ’All attempts to undermine his conservative credentials on specific issues were ineffective, regardless of the setting (live surveys, online surveys, focus groups, controlled experiments). Even when you show video to Republican primary voters with complete context of President Trump saying something otherwise objectionable to primary voters, they find a way to rationalize and dismiss it.’

2) ’Every traditional post-production ad attacking President Trump either backfired or produced no impact on his ballot support and favorability’.

3) ’The best performing ads include non-scripted Republicans sharing reservations in their own words that touch on the themes and broadly acceptable messaging (the latter are listed in the memo: they are US-context specific)’ but also ‘Notably, when the same testimonial-type of ad provides commentary on a specific issue in President Trump’s record, they are largely ineffective.’

4) ’It is essential to disarm the viewer at the opening of the ad by establishing that the person being interviewed on camera is a Republican who previously supported President Trump; otherwise, the viewer will automatically put their guard up, assuming the messenger is just another Trump-hater whose opinion should be summarily dismissed.’

5) In Iowa when specific issues were raised: ‘Most of the ads we tested in focus groups and online randomized controlled experiments failed to damage President Trump’s favorability and ballot support. This included attacks on his handling of the pandemic, promotion of vaccines, praise of Dr.Fauci, insane government spending, failure to build the wall, recent attacks on pro-life legislation, refusal to fight woke issues, openness to gun control, and many others.’

The NYT article acknowledged that this ‘remarkably candid memo’ had revealed how resilient former President Trump has been against millions of dollars of negative ads the group deployed against him. It noted that despite a concerted effort to find a message that could peel off Trump supporters, the group found that nothing works. “[A]ll attempts to undermine his conservative credentials on specific issues were ineffective”.

What’s going on?

The NYT article caught the attention of FrameLab. This is the online newsletter about ‘politics, language and your brain’ that communicates the work of George Lakoff, formerly Distinguished Professor of Cognitive Science and Linguistics at the University of California Berkley. It published (8 October): ‘Framing 101: Some brains you just can’t change – examining a failed effort to reduce conservative support for Trump’.

It argues that key to understanding the challenge of shifting political opinion is this: ‘When the facts don’t fit the frames, the frames are kept and the facts ignored’.This explanation derives from research by Professor Lakoff which led to his seminal book from 2004, ‘Don’t Think of An Elephant: Know Your Values and Frame the Debate’.

The proposition in the FrameLab piece is that ‘ideas’ (or views) exist physically in the brain, in physical structures called frames that are created in the brain’s neural circuitry. Moreover: ‘The more certain ideas get activated in your brain, the stronger they become — physically.’ It goes on: ’Framing is literally the art of changing minds — that is, changing brains. But once certain issues have been framed in the brain, they can become impossible to change. This is especially the case with anything related to a person’s worldview, morality and identity.’

The authors of the FrameLab article write: ‘We often hear the question: What’s a way to convince Trump supporters to stop supporting Trump? The answer is: There isn’t a way. Sure, there may be a very slim percentage of his supporters who decide to stop supporting him for various reasons. For the most part, however, anyone still supporting Trump is locked into the position. (And attacking Trump only solidifies their support for him.) This is because supporting Trump has become an important part of their identity and worldview. In order to turn against Trump, they would have to turn against their own selves. People tend to avoid doing this.’

The FrameLab piece expands on the challenge of shifting views: ‘One of the things cognitive science teaches us is that when people define their very identity by a worldview, or a narrative, or a mode of thought, they are unlikely to change – for the simple reason that it is physically part of their brain, and so many other aspects of their brain structure would also have to change; that change is highly unlikely.’

So is it hopeless?

Fortunately, the FrameLab authors offer up some hope, from a Democrat perspective in the US context! ‘We don’t need to change the minds of Trump’s supporters, the vast majority of whom are far beyond the reach of logic, persuasion or rationality.’

‘Instead, efforts must be focused on swing voters — biconceptuals — who may lean Republican but still believe American democracy is more important than Trump. Deep down, these swing voters still can’t fit Trump into their moral framework. … These are the people with conservative beliefs who are potentially reachable — with messages framed from a moral perspective …’

Pragmatically, it also states: ‘Of course, Democrats must motivate their base and increase voter turnout, which is an important part of any campaign. But there’s no use in wasting money or effort trying to convert Trump cult members back to reality. Sadly, that’s generally not how brains work. It’s Framing 101.’

Relevance for here?

Whilst there is so much that is different between the US context and the challenges we face in Scotland in shifting stubbornly Unionist voters towards support for independence, we do have human brains with their structure of neural circuitry in common!

I am no expert in either of these matters – not in political campaigning and not in the workings of the brain. However, intuitively it seems appropriate to ponder if support for the Union – given it is a part of some voters’ identity and worldview – can substitute for support for Trump in this kind of analysis. And there surely are times when it seems too many Unionist voters are indeed ‘beyond the reach of logic, persuasion or rationality’ regardless of the facts that are placed before them!

If factual evidence won’t change minds what might work in the Scottish context, at least with the still ‘persuadables’? I am struck by two phrases in the FrameLab article:

1) ’biconceptuals — who may lean Republican but still believe American democracy is more important than Trump.’ – might this be transferred into ‘who may lean towards the Union but believe that Scotland’s democracy is more important’?

2) ’people with conservative beliefs who are potentially reachable — with messages framed from a moral perspective …’ – might this be transferred into ‘people with Unionist beliefs who are potentially reachable – with messages framed from a moral (or perhaps better, a principled) perspective i.e. the fundamental right of those living in Scotland to choose or reject national self-determination’?

Out of left field perhaps!

In the light of all the above, and thinking about framing messages based on fundamental principles rather than specific public policy issues, brought to mind the following: ‘The Stirling Directive – To pursue our inalienable right of self-determination as guaranteed under international law’. (my emphasis: see https://salvo.scot/stirling-directive/ )

And expanded in a press release: ‘… restoring Scotland to its rightful status as an independent nation, requires a profound change in the way the people of this nation understand, think and talk about Scotland and the Union.

‘We maintain that the best and the correct way to achieve this is by raising awareness, informing the people of Scotland of their true, constitutional position and, leading by example, demonstrating the true character of the Union and the inalienable rights of the people. Democracy only works when the people are able to make informed choices. The Stirling Directive intends to enable that informed, democratic choice.’ 

I find much to agree with in the basic, the fundamental principles set out in the above paragraphs, even if IMHO the broader rhetoric adopted by the authors and proponents of the Stirling Directive doesn’t convince as a narrative for framing messages to shift ‘persuadables’.

However, I do find merit in the writing of blogger Peter Bell in a recent post entitled ‘The man with the message’ (7 October: see https://peterabell.scot/2023/10/07/the-man-with-the-message/# ). (Apologies for simply reproducing long extracts from this blog but representing at length the construction of the case being put is important.)

By some it may regarded as overly pessimistic, but this from Mr Bell deserves close attention given where matters stand in UK politics, including the present state of progress in Scotland on changing stubbornly fixed views: ‘An election pretending to be an independence referendum will not produce a clear and decisive mandate for dissolution of the Union. It is doubtful is (sic) a de facto referendum ever could result in such a mandate. But for it to even come close to doing so would require a sizeable majority of a sizeable turnout voting for a manifesto commitment to specific actions that none of the pro-independence parties is offering.

And pragmatically: ’A de facto referendum as an exercise of Scotland’s right of self-determination must be rejected on the basis of a straightforward risk assessment. There is little chance of winning and even if we win what is won will not suffice. There is a very good chance of losing and what is lost would spell disaster for Scotland’s cause. the (sic) grey area in this risk assessment is so narrow as to be invisible.’

This approaches the kind of reasoned, risked assessment of competing ‘theories of change’ for achieving the final outcome of actual independence which I referred to btl on TuS a few days ago. And as a consequence, there emerges the recognition of the merits of achieving an important and enabling intermediate outcome.

Back to Mr Bell: ’If there is to be a de facto referendum then the sensible thing to do is make it about the superficially ‘lesser’ matter of the powers of the Scottish Parliament. The manifesto commitment should, in the first instance, be a statement of intent to have the Scottish Parliament assert its competence in all matters relating to Scotland’s constitution; initially, but not exclusively, for the purpose of facilitating a proper constitutional referendum which will stand as a formal and decisive exercise of our right of self-determination – there being no other way this can happen.’

In relatively short order, having the legal powers to achieve Scotland’s independence vested in the Holyrood parliament and therefore in the Scottish electorate – for now and if still needed, for (effectively) all time – would be a hugely significant advance. And in present circumstances, it may be a more achievable objective that (an illusory?) one step to independence via a General Election in 2024.

Going back to where I pondered the potential of two transfers from US insights to help create frames capable of shifting the fixed views of ‘persuadables’ towards independence viz. (i) focusing on those who may lean towards Unionism but may believe that Scotland’s democracy is more important; and (ii) people with Unionist beliefs who are potentially reachable with messages framed from a principled perspective – in this situation, the right of national self-determination’.

Like many I suspect, I await with keen interest what will emerge from deliberations at the upcoming SNP conference. And yes, I will wait with some trepidation over the subsequent impact of the party’s decisions on relations within the wider pro-independence movement.